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DATE 2008

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21 September 1962

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
Department of the Army  
Attention: ISR

FROM: [ ]

SUBJECT: WACHI Takaji (0735/4249/7751/0059) (SD 10208)

1. Reference is made to the request dated 1 August 1962, subject as above, whose name you desired checked against the files of this office. The files contain the following information concerning an individual who is probably identifiable with the subject of the request.

2. According to a report dated 28 April 1961, received through an ( ), the source stated that he had been informed in 1959 by a personal friend, one WACHI Takaji, formerly a Lieutenant General in the Japanese Army, that OGATA Shunsaku (1442/1748/0193/0155), a suspected information broker, was in a position to help the Japanese Government and the United States military authorities in the Far East smash a narcotics ring, sponsored by the Chinese Communists, which had bases in Hong Kong and Macao.

3. According to a report dated 13 January 1955, received from a usually reliable source, WACHI Takaji, a former Lieutenant General, was identified as a member of the Ajia Konwa Kai (0068/4798/0068/2017/6114/2585) (Asian Affairs Discussion Society) located in the Saiwai Building, Uchi Saiwai-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo. This organization contained a number of former military and naval personnel and individuals with intelligence experience; however, nothing was known at the time concerning the organization's supporters or its intelligence activities. WACHI was described as having had intelligence experience, and he was considered a specialist on China.

4. According to a report dated 7 March 1952, received from a fairly reliable source, one Colonel WACHI Takaji (0735/2535/7751/0059) was involved with the DOIHARA Kikan Operations Unit

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in Shanghai circa June 1938 to about April 1939 and he was delegated the responsibility of bringing the Kwangsi Army over to the Japanese side. The DOIHARA Operation was a morale operation aimed at resolving the Chinese war by the establishment of a new central government in China around one T'ANG Shao-i who was subsequently assassinated in September 1938 allegedly by "agents of CHIANG."

5. Information contained in a report dated 24 October 1952, received from a usually reliable source, content evaluation "possibly true", indicated that former Lieutenant General WACHI Takaji was a member of the Japan-China Collaborative Society which was basically a "rightist" organization composed of Taiwanese who were opposed to CHIANG Kai-shek. WACHI was one of several leading Japanese figures who belonged to the society. Its ideology was described as being anti-Kuomintang, anti-United States, and somewhat favorable to Communist China.

6. According to a report dated 5 December 1952, received from a usually reliable source, one WACHI Takaji (0735/2535/7751/0059) attended a meeting on 20 October 1952, of the Patriotic Youth Volunteer Committee (Aikoku Seinen Yushi Iinkai). The Patriotic Youth Volunteer Committee was, at the writing of the report, anti-Communist and stressed the necessity for rearmament.

7. According to a report dated 19 December 1952, received from a usually reliable source, WACHI Takaji (0735/0966/7751/0059), was a backer of a "rightist" society called Akebono-no-Sha with headquarters at Tokyo-to, Chiyoda-ku, Kanda Jimbo-cho, 1-16. This society of former army officers was founded in May 1952 with the objectives of opposing Communism, promoting rearmament, and security aid for disabled veterans. It had a capital of \$900,000 and published a monthly magazine, Akebono, in about 4,000 copies. WACHI was described as a former Lieutenant General and as a graduate of the 26th class of the Japanese War College.

8. According to a report dated 19 April 1951, received from a source whose reliability cannot be judged, content evaluation "possibly true", WACHI Takaji was a Major General, Japanese Army, Infantry, at the time of his leadership of the RAN (Orchid) Kikan (1938-1942). He was later elevated to the rank of Lieutenant General and served from 1942 onward primarily in military commands. WACHI had served many years in China, was quite fluent in the Chinese language, and claimed to be on good terms with many high-ranking Chungking figures in the Chinese Nationalist regime. For these reasons, not by reason of any intelligence experience, he was ordered in 1938 to form the RAN Kikan, with the objective of secret political operations to subvert the Chungking Government and simultaneously to procure mili-

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tary information concerning Chungking. When WACHI had been in Kwangsi much earlier, he had formed a close association with LI Tsung-jen and PAI Chung-hsi, leaders of the later "Kwangsi Clique". His prime operations were aimed at subversion and defection of these individuals, which he claimed would be only a matter of time. WACHI often boasted that their friendship and loyalty toward him was very great, and LI and PAI apparently played along with him. Actually, the source indicated that the general consensus of opinion was that the two Chinese leaders, who had a very influential and almost autonomous position in South China, really disliked WACHI intensely even though he did not realize it. In any event, he never succeeded in defecting them. Source had the following to say in regard to WACHI's ability:

a. WACHI's RAN Kikan, in contrast to the UME Kikan, produced very few reports, and although WACHI was not believed to have been dishonest, he was considered in the Shanghai area to be completely unfit for intelligence work. The RAN Kikan remained small throughout its rather non-productive history. Source met WACHI occasionally during Source's Shanghai tour of duty and was (at the date of this report) on good terms with him. Source further added that he liked WACHI personally but did not think much of his ability. The source first met WACHI in a professional capacity about the end of 1939. Source had rounded up a number of clandestine radio operators in the Shanghai area who had been under suspicion for some time, jailed them, and prepared to interrogate them. Several days later, WACHI phoned him, even though Source's office was a stone's throw away from WACHI's and indicated quite insecurely on the telephone that several of the jailed radio operators belonged to the RAN Kikan. Source quickly visited WACHI and WACHI could not describe nor name the operators. WACHI did not know which officer in his unit was running those radiomen, so, with Source still present, he called in all his unit officers to find out which officer was running what radio operators. Later, when WACHI moved to the Hankow area, as he did several times, he set up a large sign at his billet in Hankow reading "WACHI Butai HQ", and visitors entering saw the eminent Major General and one enlisted clerk. Most of WACHI's few subordinates were civilians, some of whom were reputed to be quite able.

b. According to Source, as the above illustrates, WACHI was a very insecure person for intelligence work, and he apparently had few clear ideas of exactly what he was after. He frequently became very enthusiastic about a project advanced by a subordinate, approved it, and then

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forgot completely what it was or why he had wanted it. As a result, WACHI's projects were often very numerous, but few of them ever were followed through to a logical and successful conclusion. His thinking was rapid, enthusiastic, and large-scale, but he could never wait for results and hardly recognized common ordinary intelligence information as a worthwhile result. According to Source, big things had to happen, and quickly to suit WACHI. The few successes achieved on a working level by the HAN Kikan were primarily due to subordinates and in spite of WACHI. Nevertheless, WACHI was highly thought of by Imperial General Headquarters. Source further indicated that WACHI operated far and wide with very little assistance, but if he had achieved any successes, all of Shanghai and Nanking would have heard about it from him, so it is very doubtful if he did get very far in his political objectives.

Comment: The source of the above mentioned report might possibly have been mistaken and have underrated the connection between WACHI and the Kwangsi Clique personalities, however it threw an interesting light on the intentions of the JONAN Group which was a rather extensive group of former Japanese Intelligence Service officers, militarists, and conservative political leaders, whose aims were to form "a syndicate with far reaching influence and well-laid plans for reassertion of Japanese militarist-nationalism in every phase of the nation's life." WACHI was a secret member of the JONAN Group which had plans of working closely with the Chinese Third Force.

9. Information contained in a report dated 28 August 1951, received from a usually reliable source, indicated that Lieutenant General WACHI Takaji and other former members of the secret sections of the JONAN-Genyosha Group were being asked by one SATOMI Hajime to discontinue contacts with the JONAN office even by phone until the future status of the organization could be either determined or terminated. SATOMI became upset in early June 1951 at the failure of the JONAN Company to provide adequate funds and with FURUYA Tatsuo's (who was president of the JONAN Company) personal ambitions that he threatened to abandon the enterprise completely and engage in his own clandestine organizations and operations exclusively.

10. Information contained in a report dated 16 November 1951, received from a fairly reliable source, indicated that former Lieutenant General WACHI Takaji (0735/4249/7751/0059) was a Japanese adviser of the Sino-Japanese Cultural and Economic Association which was organized in Hong Kong and supported by the American Consulate there.

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11. According to a report dated 30 April 1946, received from a predecessor organization which evaluated the source as fairly reliable and the content evaluation as "possibly true", one WACHI Takaji, a staff officer of the Tientsin Garrison Headquarters travelled with one Colonel SHIGEWAKA to Peking on 9 July 1937, to effect an armistice with the Chinese. He returned to Tientsin two days later when no accord had been reached with the Chinese.


12. According to an article which appeared in 9 October 1953, edition of the Japanese newspaper YOMIURI SHIMBUN, former Lieutenant General WACHI (fnu), who is probably identifiable with the subject of the request, belonged to an organization called the Special Intelligence Group. This group operated within the Japanese General Staff Headquarters as the Special Intelligence Section and was formerly divided into various squads known respectively as the Soviet, American, British, German and French squads. They specialized in monitoring wireless transmissions and deciphering coded messages intercepted from their respective spheres. This group comprised an organization that was associated with the special military organs, and WACHI's group was known as the RAN Kikan. The article indicated that the members of this group had origins and functions which remained undisclosed, in brief, they remained in the background.

13. Information contained in a report dated 13 February 1951, received from a usually reliable source, indicated that one Lieutenant General WAJI (or WACHI) (fnu), who is probably identifiable with the subject of the request, was reputed to be a top-notch intelligence officer with considerable experience and training and was a former close associate of both SATOMI Hajime and former Kwantung Army G-2 Lieutenant General YANAGIDA. He entered the Jonan Peace and Independence Committee group at the request of SATOMI, and worked closely with one SAKURABA Shiro who was listed overtly as the Managing Director of the JONAN Company and KAWAMOTO Yoshishiro who was connected with the secret section of the JONAN Company. WACHI was interested chiefly in the recruitment of former Harbin Intelligence School graduates to use them as a nucleus for a future Japan Intelligence Service. Most of WACHI's experience was overseas, and he had a low opinion of the NAKANO School in comparison to the Harbin School. Source further reported on 11 April 1951, that Lieutenant General WACHI was a senior advisor in the Japanese Army Intelligence Revival Section of the JONAN Group.

Comment: There was a listing in the Army Officers Roster, 1943 for WACHI Takaji, Major General (date of rank, March 1940), Infantry. His assignment as of February 1942 was Chief of Staff, 14th Army. At this post,

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one Lieutenant General UTSUNOMIYA (fnu), who was (in 1951) an employee of the Geographical and Historical Section, G-2, GHQ, was one of his staff officers.

14. According to a report dated 29 March 1951, received from the same usually reliable source as in paragraph 13 above, Lieutenant General WACHI (fnu), a member of the Jonan group, and several other former Japanese Army and Navy leaders and other individuals connected with the National Rural Police Director-General attended a secret conference held at "OMORI TEI" (OMORI Chop House) Omori on 27 February 1951. Source stated that the details of this meeting were not known, but it was described as "top secret". The same type of meeting was to be held once a month from that time on.

15. According to a report dated 4 June 1946, received from a predecessor organization, Lieutenant General WACHI (fnu), was a prominent radical who held an intelligence post in the China Expeditionary Forces (CEF). WACHI served as right-hand man to one General MAZAKI and in 1933, when WACHI held the rank of Colonel, he became Chief of the Dai Ni Ka and had as his assistant one Colonel TSUJI. In 1939 WACHI, after promotion to Major General, and TSUJI were removed to the front at Hankow. At the end of the war WACHI was Assistant Chief of Staff of Nambosogun (Southern Forces). The policy which WACHI and TSUJI endeavored to enforce was complete military domination of China and the dividing of China into two states, the North China Provisional Government and the Taido Puppet Regime. They strongly opposed the formation of the Wong Ching Wei Puppet Government. As a result of the insubordinate activity by these individuals, TOJO sent one HARUKE (fnu) and one SAKATA (fnu) in 1939 as supervisors to the Headquarters, CEF, but they were gradually influenced by the radicals and became involved in exploitation and fortune seeking rackets. However, by 1943 TOJO had managed to eliminate most of the radical staff officers from CEF Headquarters, usually by sending them off to the front.

16. For additional information concerning WACHI Takaji, you are referred to the Department of the Army, Headquarters, Fourth District, 441st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment.

17. You are also referred to CS-25685, dated 30 November 1953, subject: Restoration Movement Council in Kanto District; and CS-43517, dated 30 July 1954, subject: Relationship between LI Tsung-jen and HO I-chih.


\_\_\_\_\_ has no record of a current operational interest in Subject.

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Based on: FJTA-35568; FJB-635; FJJ-6; ZJY-5587; ZJL-604; ZJJ-6; ZJJ-275; ZJL-696A; YEX-2094; FJJA-2038; ZJL-561A; ZJL-591; ZJL-583; YEX-2294 (retained at desk); FJBA-4387; CS-25685 and CS-43517.

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